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A Colonial Castle: Defence of Property in R v Stanley
Alexandra Flynn and Estair Van Wagner*

*Abstract*

In 2016, Gerald Stanley shot 22-year-old Colten Boushie in the back of the head after Boushie
and his friends entered his farm. Boushie died instantly. Stanley relied on the defence of accident
and was found not guilty be an all-white jury. Throughout the trial, Stanley invoked concerns
about trespass and rural crime (particularly property crime), much of which was of limited
relevance to whether or not the shooting was an accident. We argue that the assertions of trespass
shaped the trial, yet were not tested by the jury through a formal invocation of the defence of
property.

Keywords: criminal law, property, criminal justice, defences, statutory defences,
air of reality, defence of property, trespass, jury instructions, castle doctrine,
Indigenous lands, Treaty relations
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On August 9, 2016, at about 5 pm, on an otherwise unremarkable summer afternoon, five
Indigenous youths from the Red Pheasant First Nation drove onto a rural Saskatchewan farm
owned by 56-year-old Gerald Stanley, a White farmer.1 The youths, aged 17–24, had spent the
day drinking and swimming in the South Saskatchewan River, after which their grey Ford
Escape SUV had sprung a leak. They had previously visited a nearby farm where they had
allegedly tried to steal a truck. While their intentions are disputed, what is known is that after a
series of events, including the windshield of the youths’ car being smashed with a hammer and
the firing of a warning shot into the air, Stanley shot 22-year-old Colten Boushie in the back of
the head.2 Boushie died instantly.3 At the ensuing trial, there was mixed evidence as to whether
the youths were seeking help or were planning to steal when they entered Stanley’s farm.4 The
police and the media immediately adopted the language of trespass to describe the incident.
According to the defence, Stanley drew his gun when Boushie and his friends drove onto his
rural property to fire warning shots because he thought they were stealing his property. Stanley
argued that while he meant to fire warning shots, the gun went off accidentally when Colton
Boushie was killed.
Canadian law provides for defence of property through section 35(1) of the Canadian
Criminal Code, which sets out the conditions for a statutory defence for otherwise unlawful
actions taken to protect property.5 Stanley did not expressly assert self-defence, or defence of
property, and instead formally relied on the defence of accident. However, the defence
repeatedly invoked concerns about trespass and rural crime (particularly property crime), much
of which was of limited relevance to whether or not the shooting was an accident.6 Ultimately,
the jury accepted the argument that Boushie’s death was simply an accident, a by-product of
reasonable conduct to address rural crime combined with a faulty weapon. As we argue below,
this strategic decision to rely solely on the defence of accident meant that important elements of
the defence’s narrative—including the status of the youths as “trespassers”, the “terrifying”
nature of the situation, and the “reasonableness” of using a firearm to respond to the situation—
went unexamined, while nonetheless being allowed to shape the account presented to the jury.7
The story of the Stanley case is more complicated than the tale of an innocent farmer’s
unfortunate,-but-understandable accident that emerged at trial. Narratives about property,
trespass, and rural crime, ran through the trial and the media coverage. Indeed, the logic of the
defence rests squarely on the status of the youths as trespassers, and the right of Stanley to
respond to trespass and the mere fear of property crime with a firearm. The following sections of
this paper explore how these narratives were used to draw the unique and complex land-based
tensions in rural Saskatchewan into the courtroom in consequential ways. As we outline below,
Guy Quenneville, “What happened on Gerald Stanley's farm the day Colten Boushie was shot, as told by
witnesses,” (6 February 2018), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatoon/what-happened-stanleyfarm-boushie-shot-witnesses-colten-gerald-1.4520214>.
2
Ibid. This article does not provide a full description of the events related to the case. For more detail, see R v
Stanley, 2019 SKQB 277 and R. v. Stanley, Trial Transcript) [Stanley Trial Transcript].
3
Ibid. Note that this article does not set out a full description of the events related to the case.
4
Stanley Trial Transcript at 284–328 (Eric Meechance, evidence in chief & cross-examination).
5
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 35 [Criminal Code].
6
Stanley Trial Transcript, supra note 2, at 606–07 (Defence’s opening address at 851–52 (Defence’s closing
address).
7
Ibid.
1
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these tensions played a troubling role in the trial, allowing fear, racist stereotypes, and
assumptions about who does or does not belong in rural Saskatchewan to frame the defence’s
story.
In section 2, we explore the concept of trespass in Canadian law, including the 2012
federal reforms of the defence of property in response to calls for increased protection for
property owners who expel alleged trespassers from “their” land.8 In section 3, we examine the
presumptive story of trespass woven into the Stanley trial and consider the implications of the
defence of property, which was not put to the jury for the shooting that led to Boushie’s death. In
section 4, we examine trespass and the defence of property in the context of Treaty relations
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada. This paper does not present the
evidence introduced to substantiate the defence of accident, which ultimately led to Stanley’s
exoneration, although many other experts have questioned its scientific validity.9 In our view it is
crucial that the legal profession confront how property and trespass were invoked to intersect
with, and compound, racism and colonialism in R v Stanley. As lawyers, scholars, and judges, we
must critically consider the consequences for access to justice for Indigenous peoples and the
future of relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada.
2. Invoking the Castle: Trespass and Defence of Property in Canadian Law
The intersection of civil and criminal law, the defence of property, and the common law roots of
the castle doctrine create a strange inconsistency in how Canadian law treats trespass and the
protection of private property. Based on the same actions, an individual deemed a “trespasser”,
can meet with consequences ranging from a civil award of damages, to a modest fine where
trespass is proven by the Crown and enforced by the police, to to the application of force,
including the use of firearms by a private citizen prior to arrest, the involvement of the police or
criminal justice system, and any form of trial. Notably, police responses to property crime are
generally limited, including restrictions on the use of lethal force.10
In the context of the Stanley trial, the status of the youths as trespassers played a central
role in the defence’s version of events. However, the farm was not enclosed with a fence. The
youths were not asked to leave the farm before a firearm was retrieved, nor before shots were
fired. Indeed, muddy shoe prints and a pair of shoes were found in the long driveway, suggesting
that some of the youths were attempting to leave the property. No one called the police until after
Boushie was killed. In contrast to Stanley’s actions, the police response to the alleged trespass
would have been limited to charging the youths with a summary offence, carrying a fine of no
more than $2000. In our view, this case reflects serious problems related to the construction and
application of the “right” to defend private property in Canada, as discussed below.
The civil law of trespass
Steve Rennie, “Were Harper's comments on gun ownership misinterpreted?” (23 March 2015) online: CTV News ,
<www.ctvnews.ca/politics/were-harper-s-comments-on-gun-ownership-misinterpreted-1.2292544>.
9
See e.g., Kent Roach, Canadian Justice, Indigenous Injustice: The Gerald Stanley and Colten Boushie Case
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2019); David M Tanovich, “Boushie’s family - and our justice system
- deserves answers. So why no appeal?”, The Globe and Mail (8 March 2018), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-boushies-family-and-our-justice-system-deserves-answers-so-why/>.
10
Criminal Code, supra note 5, ss 25–27.
8
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Trespass is a longstanding concept in both criminal and civil law in Canada, and is
defined as, “the act of entering upon land, in the possession of another, or placing or throwing or
erecting some material object thereon without the legal right to do so.”11 The essence of trespass
is the protection of possession and control over the use of private land, as well as the privacy of
the possessor.12
In civil law, trespass plays both a compensatory and deterrent role in protecting the
possession and control of land.13 It is a tort through which owners of private land can enforce
their right to exclude others from their land. Courts can remedy the damage caused by trespass
by awarding damages, requiring someone to pay for having accessed the land, or granting an
injunction requiring the trespass to stop. In criminal law, trespass can be an offence, and it can
also be the basis for a defence. The offence of trespass, s. 177 of the Criminal Code, applies in
only limited circumstances, having been specifically introduced to capture “Peeping Tom”
conduct and not “petty trespass.”14 None of the required elements were present in Stanley.
Trespass is largely addressed as a regulatory offence under provincial statutes, such as
Saskatchewan’s 2009 Trespass to Property Act.15 Saskatchewan was the last common law
province to enact specific trespass legislation. Prior to this 2009 legislative enactment, civil
action was the main remedy for trespass in Saskatchewan, unless the trespass fell under specific
circumstances covered by statute, such as snowmobiling, or where the police could intervene
under the narrow Criminal Code provisions described below.16 This legislative gap may have
contributed to a sense that police enforcement against trespass and rural property crime was
limited, because in many circumstances the police had few tools available to deal with situations
of entry onto private land without consent.17 Notably, the 1980 Ontario reform to provincial
trespass laws (similar to the scheme in Saskatchewan’s 2009 Trespass to Property Act) was
motivated by the need to “facilitate prosecutions and increase the protection of interests of rural
landowners” and was a response to the perception that rural property was under-policed.18
At the time of the Stanley trial, the Saskatchewan’s TPA provided for police arrest
powers and modest fines for entry onto private land without consent, where notice was given or
the land was enclosed.19 Until notice was given, entry onto unenclosed private land could not be
deemed trespass until a request to leave had been made by the occupier and the person entering
the premises had failed to leave within a reasonable period of time. Unlike some provincial

11

Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation v Canada (AG), 2016 SKCA 124 at para 128, citing Mann v Saulnier, 19 DLR (2d)
130 at 132, [1959] NBJ No 12 (QL)(SC (AD)).
12
Philip H Osborne, The Law of Torts, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 295–96.
13
Ibid.
14
R v Priestap, 79 OR (3d) 561, 2006 CanLII 12288 at paras 27–28 (CA).
15
SS 2009, c T-20.2 [TPA (Sask)]. The amendments removed the requirements for notice or enclosure, effectively
reversing the onus on landowners to those wanting to enter private property.
16
See e.g., Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 26:2, vol 51, no 31A (11 March 2009)
at 2228 (Hon Buckley Belanger).
17
Ibid, vol 51, no 9A (5 November 2008) at 1594–95 (Hon Don Morgan).
18
R v Asante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38 at para 31, considering the 1980 Occupiers’ Liability Act, SO 1980, c 14.
19
TPA (Sask), supra note 15, ss 5, 6, as it appeared on 9 August, 2016. Fines under the Act are capped at $2,000, as
they were before the amendment.
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regimes, Saskatchewan’s TPA does not provide for citizen’s arrest.20 Where such powers do
exist, they require the person arrested to be delivered into the custody of law enforcement.21
In the aftermath of the Stanley trial, the Saskatchewan government amended the TPA to
shift the onus from the landowner to those seeking to enter private property.22 Now, it does not
include a notice requirement in relation to entry in or on a lawn, a garden, a yard site, cultivated
or grazing land, the broadly defined category of “enclosed land”, and lands designated by
regulation.* The government stated that the amendments “better balances the rights of rural land
owners and members of the public” and cited the results of a public survey with 1601
respondents, which was later criticized as “heavily flawed” and not representative of the
population.23 The amended Saskatchewan legislation goes further than any other Canadian
jurisdiction in requiring express permission to enter rural property.24 In short, the effect is to
deem any entrant onto rural property in the province as a “trespasser”. These amendments have
been strongly opposed by Indigenous nations in Saskatchewan, who assert both that they are an
unconstitutional restriction on their Treaty rights and that they will lead to more violent
confrontations.25 Combined with poorly informed ideas about the right to defend private property
with violence, the new legislation raises concerns about vigilantism and property owners taking
the law into their own hands to deal with trespassers.
In addition to recourse to police powers and civil action, common law has allowed
landowners to lawfully defend their property against trespass. The duty to retreat from a threat
rather than respond with lethal violence has been a core element of English law for centuries,
upholding the role of the state in meting out justice in a “civilized” society.26 However, the
“castle doctrine” which emerged as a crucial exception, can be traced back to the comments of
Lord Coke in the 1604 Semayne’s Case. He stated, “the house of every one [sic] is to him as his
castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose”.27 The
doctrine provides legal protections for those who defend their property from an intruder rather
than retreat. Under common law, a person could use deadly force to defend their home, but only

20

See e.g., Trespass Act to Property Act, RSO 1990, c T.21, s 9(1) [Trespass Act to Property Act (Ont)].
Ibid, s 9(2).
22
The Trespass to Property Amendment Act, 2019, SS 2019, c 26, ss 4, 7.
23
Government of Saskatchewan, “Legislation Ensuring Fair Balance on Trespass Rules Moves Forward” (8 May
2019), online: <www.saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-media/2019/may/08/trespass-act>; See Survey results,
“Government Releases Results of Trespass Survey” (15 November 2018), online:
<www.saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-media/2018/november/15/trespass-survey> [“Government Releases
Results”]; See also S. Taylor, “Researcher says Sask. Government’s trespassing laws survey was ‘flawed” (16
November 2019), online: CBC Saskatchewan <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/saskatchewan-trespasssurvey-flawed-says-researcher-1.4909472>.
24
See the comparative chart of express permission requirements provided in the Saskatchewan government’s
Review of Trespass Related Legislation: [“Government Releases Results”, supra note 23 at 8, online:
<www.saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-media/2018/november/15/trespass-survey>.
25
“FSIN leaders vote to oppose trespassing laws” (20 February 2019), online: CTV Regina <regina.ctvnews.ca/fsinleaders-vote-to-oppose-trespassing-laws-1.4305700>. See also Kelly Geraldine Malone, “Indigenous people worry
Saskatchewan trespassing plan may stoke racial tensions” (4 November 2018) online: Saskatchewan Leader Post
<leaderpost.com/news/local-news/indigenous-people-worry-saskatchewan-trespassing-plan-may-stoke-racialtensions/wcm/27bec009-3bcf-48bb-ad4d-bea0891da4f4> [FSIN leaders].
26
Sir William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1796).
27
Semayne’s Case, (1604) 5 Co Rep 91a, 77 ER 194 (KB) at 195.
21
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after using every reasonable means to avoid the danger.28 In the United States, use-of-force laws
vary by state, as does their interpretation by police, prosecutors, and judges.29 However, neither
the castle doctrine, nor more recent American so-called ‘stand your ground’ legislation, which
protects those who use force to protect their property, justify an attack without cause, and the law
varies regarding the permissibility of lethal force.30
The castle doctrine, though simple in description, involves social and legal ambiguity. On
one hand, no jurisdiction allows the express ability to kill another person for accessing or
trespassing onto one’s property.31 On the other hand, the castle doctrine suggests moral
justification in protecting one’s property and defending against perceived threats to one’s person
associated with an invasion of “home”.32 This contradiction has led to considerable debate in the
United States and elsewhere about the philosophical justification of the castle doctrine, where
highly controversial killings of young — usually Black — men have escaped legal punishment
based on the “reasonableness” of the perceived threat posed by the victim.33 Caroline Light’s
study of stand your ground laws in the United States exposes the castle doctrine as firmly rooted
in racist and misogynist foundations of the White supremacist settler colonial state.34 The “right”
to honourably defend life and property, rather than retreat in the face of an intrusion, is grounded
in the right to own property, which largely formally excluded all but White men in colonial
North America, and informally continues to be linked to systemic inequality.35 In the context of
the unequal distribution of property rights, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies
noted that the defence of property “prima facie reinforces inequalities”.36 Jeannie Suk argues that
the castle doctrine constructs trespass as a kind of boundary-crossing “beyond the protection of
the law” and into a space in which “the state monopoly on violence” is suspended.37 Both Suk
and Light concluded that only certain types of homes and homeowners merit this type of
protection. Other lives and bodies retain only a tenuous right to belong and inhabit.
In Saskatchewan, where the Stanley trial took place, the castle doctrine was invoked to
justify the use of force to defend the agrarian idyll of the rural farm.38 Some local news media
coverage suggested that there is something sacred and defensible about the rural home, and that
See generally Stanley Yeo, “Killing a Home Invader” (2011) 57 Crim LQ 181.
Mark Randall & Hendrik DeBoer, The Castle Doctrine and Stand-Your-Ground Law (Connecticut: Office of
Legislative Research, OLR Research Report, 2012), (24 April 2012) online: Connecticut General Assembly
<www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-R-0172.htm>.
30
Ibid.
31
See Stanley Yeo, “Killing in defence of property” (2010) 36:2 Commonwealth L Bull 281.
32
See Jeannie Suk, At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence Revolution is Transforming Privacy (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
33
Ibid.
34
Stand Your Ground: A History of America’s Love Affair with Lethal Self-Defense (Boston, MA: Beacon Press,
2017).
35
Ibid at 20.
36
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, “Reforming Criminal Code Defences: Provocation, SelfDefence and Defence of Property” (2013), online (pdf): www.caefs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Response-tothe-Department-of-Justice-re-Reforming-Criminal-Code-Defences-Provocation-Self-Defence-and-Defence-ofProperty.pdf [CAEFS].
37
Suk, supra note 32 at 59.
38
Tammy Robert, “No, rural Prairie dwellers, you can’t shoot to protect your property” (8 February 2018), online:
Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca/news/no-rural-prairie-dwellers-you-cant-shoot-to-protect-your-property/>.
28
29
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laws should reinforce this sentiment.39 Racial bias against Indigenous youths are apparent in
many of these accounts, at times both implicitly and explicitly.40 The presumed reasonableness
of race-based fear and stereotypes was based on a construction of a peaceful productive White
farmer and a savage Indigenous invader.
A. Historical treatment of trespass in the defence of property
The right to defend property is restricted under the Criminal Code and in common law.41 Several
sections of the Criminal Code excuse or justify what would otherwise constitute violations of
prohibited conduct because of specified extenuating circumstances.42 Canadian law has long
recognized the right “of the occupier of land to use force to remove a trespasser”.43 In the current
Criminal Code, section 35 provides a justification where an accused’s actions were for the
purpose of protecting property.
This section was amended in 2012 to consolidate several sections that were commonly
criticized as confusing and overly complex. Defence of property requires an honest, but
reasonable belief that the defendant is either in “peaceable possession” of the property or is
assisting someone else in peaceable possession of the property.44 It also requires a reasonable
belief that the other person is entering the property unlawfully or for an unlawful purpose, such
as theft or vandalism.45 If both of these criteria are met, the defence provides for the use of force
to prevent the unlawful act or to remove the person. However, the force used must be
‘reasonable’ in the particular circumstances of the event. Section 35 does not provide any
guidance on what is reasonable.46 This is in sharp contrast with the self-defence provision in s.
34, which enumerates specific factors.47 Although there is no express limitation on the amount of
Jason Markusoff, “Alberta farm shooting is a new touchstone for rural gun owners” (10 March 2018), online:
Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca/news/canada/alberta-farm-shooting-is-a-new-touchstone-for-rural-gun-owners/>.
40
Kyle Edwards, “In Saskatchewan, the Stanley verdict has re-opened centuries-old wounds,” (5 March 2018),
online: Maclean’s <www.macleans.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan-racism-gerald-stanley-colten-boushie/ >.
41
Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 8(3). The defence of property through operation of the common law is also
preserved by s 8(3) of the Criminal Code.
42
R v Green, 2017 ONCJ 705 at para 69 [Green].
43
R v Scopelliti, 34 OR (2d) 524, 1981 CarswellOnt 814 (WL Can) at para 67 (SC (AD)) [Scopelliti], cited in R v
Gilley, 332 NFLD & PEIR, 2013 CanLII 1 at para 20 (Prov Ct (Crim Div)) [Gilley]. See also Grant Smyth Garneau,
“Law Reform Commission of Canada and the Defence of Justification” (1983) 26:1 Crim LQ 121.
44
Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 35(1)(a).
45
Ibid, s 35(1)(b).
46
See e.g., R v Cormier, 2017 NBCA 10 at para 47 [Cormier]. See also Kent Roach, “A Preliminary Assessment of
the New Self-Defence and Defence of Property Provisions” (2012) 16:3 Can Crim L Rev 275 at 296 [Roach].
47
See Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 34(2), which states:
In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the court
shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties and the act,
including, but not limited to, the following factors: (a) the nature of the force or threat;
(b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other
means available to respond to the potential use of force; (c) the person’s role in the
incident; (d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; (e)
the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident; (f) the nature,
duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident, including
any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or threat; (f.1) any history of
interaction or communication between the parties to the incident; (g) the nature and
39
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force that may be used to defend property from interference, Canadian courts have held that it is
not reasonable to use deadly force in defence of property alone.48 The use of deadly force is only
reasonable in very exceptional circumstances, for example where it is necessary to protect a
person from death or grievous bodily harm, and thus, where the defence of property overlaps
with self-defence.
In R v Gunning, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) specified the elements of the
defence, stipulating that the force used by a person in peaceable possession of a dwelling house
to eject a trespasser “must have been reasonable in all the circumstances”.49 In that case, the
parties agreed, and the SCC accepted, that “the intentional killing of a trespasser could only be
justified where the person in possession of the property is able to make out a case of selfdefence.”50 The Court set out the following criteria: the defendant must have been in possession
of the dwelling-house; the possession must have been peaceable; there must have been a
trespasser; and the force used to eject the trespasser must have been reasonable in all
circumstances.51 In other words, a response in defence of property must be objectively assessed
as reasonable in the circumstances.52
In R v McKay, the SCC emphasized that it did not affirm various principles that the Manitoba
Court of Appeal decision had declared emergent from early English case law.53 The Court of
Appeal, stated at para 14:
The self defence and defence of property provisions in the Code, which find their genesis
in the common law defence of possession jurisprudence for both civil and criminal cases,
have changed little since the first enactment of the Code in 1892. Thus, early English
criminal and civil cases are often referred to in the decisions that consider these
provisions. … For example, where the removal of a mere trespasser in defence of property
is concerned, only minor force such as a push, or gentle laying of hands, will be justified.54
In defence of property alone, an accused will not be justified in beating or wounding a

proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force; and (h) whether
the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was
lawful.
48
R v Williams, 2017 BCPC 230 at para 30 [Williams].
49
R v Gunning, 2005 SCC 27 at para 25 [Gunning].
50
Ibid at para 26. For this proposition, Justice Charron points to R v Baxter, 1975 CanLII 1510, (ON CA) at 114–15,
1975 CarswellOnt 54 at para 60 (WL Can) [Baxter]; R v Clark (1983), 44 AR 141, 1983 ABCA 65 (CanLII) at para
33 (CA); and R c Bacon, 1999 CanLII 13568, 1999 CarswellQue 67 (WL Can) at para 24 (CA).
51
Baxter, supra note 50 at 113. Quoted with approval in R v Szczerbaniwicz, 2010 SCC 15 at para 19
[Szczerbaniwicz]: “The sections of the Code authorizing the use of force in defence of a person or property, to
prevent crime, and to apprehend offenders, in general, express in greater detail the great principle of the common
law that the use of force in such circumstances is subject to the restriction that the force used is necessary; that is,
that the harm sought to be prevented could not be prevented by less violent means and that the injury or harm done
by, or which might reasonably be anticipated from the force used is not disproportionate to the injury or harm it is
intended to prevent” [emphasis added]. See also, Gilley, supra note 43 at para 20.
52
Williams, supra note 48.
53
R v. McKay, 2007 SCC 16 at para 2 [McKay, 2007], referring to R. v. McKay (A.J.), 2006 MBCA 83 [McKay,
2006].
54
Gregory v Hill (1799), 110 ER 1400, 8 TR 299 (KBD) [Gregory v Hill]; R v Sullivan (1841), 1 Car & M 209
(CCC) [Sullivan].
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trespasser,55 kicking a trespasser,56 using a weapon such as an axe,57 or firing a pistol.58
On the other hand, where an accused has been struck by the trespasser59, or there has been
an attack or violence on the accused’s home [citations omitted] or the accused’s life is
threatened [citations omitted], then more force, even force causing death, may be justified
under the principles of self defence.

In its three-paragraph decision, the SCC expressly refused to endorse elements of the Court of
Appeal’s review of the scope of the defence of property, and specifically rejected the
establishment of categorical rules against “anything more than minor force” against a trespasser
or “the intentional use of a weapon” in defence of property alone.60
In Baxter, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the “firing at a mere trespasser is,
of course, not justifiable.”61 Additionally, an alleged trespasser must be given time to comply
before an occupier can use force to expel them.62 In R c Harvey, the Quebec Court of Appeal
concluded that because the defendant did not give an alleged trespasser the necessary time to
comply, the accused could not avail himself of the defence of property.63 It further specified that
“[t]he owner or possessor of property, before considering an individual a trespasser and having
the right to remove the person, must first inform the trespasser that his presence is no longer
desired, must order him to leave and finally, must give him the necessary time to do so.”64 This
is consistent with the common law, which gives an “implied licence to any member of the public
coming on his lawful business to come through the gate, up the steps, and knock on the door of
the house.”65 Whether or not the trespasser was given an opportunity to leave without the use of
force is considered to be an important part of the analysis regarding whether the force used was
reasonable.66
B. Defence of property under the Criminal Code

55

Gregory v Hill, supra note 54.
Wild’s Case (1837), 168 ER 1132, 2 Lew 214 (CC).
57
Sullivan, supra note 54.
58
Meade’s and Belt’s (1823), 168 ER 1006, (1823) 1 Lew 184, [1823] 1 WLUK 19 (Ont CA) (WL Can); R v
Scully (1824), 171 ER 1213, 1 Car & P 319 (N.P.).
59
Hinchcliffe’s Case, 168 ER 998, (1823) 1 Lew 161, [1823] 1 WLUK 5. For discussion about this early English
jurisprudence, the Manitoba Court of Appeal also points to James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law
of England, vol 3 (London: Macmillan & Co, 1883), and David Lanham, “Defence of Property in the Criminal Law”
(1966) Crim L Rev 368.
60
McKay, 2007 at para 2.
61
Baxter, supra note 50 at 114.
62
R v Greenlees, 2012 ABPC 174 at para 85, citing R v Thomas (1991), 91 Nfld & PEIR 341, 1991 CanLII 2736
(NL SC (AD)); R v Bushman, 63 WWR 346, 1968 CanLII 802 (BC CA). See also R v Kirk, [1934] DLR 641, 1934
CarswellOnt 34 at para 19 (WL Can)..
63
R c Harvey, 2016 QCCQ 8713 at para 97 [Harvey].
64
Ibid at para 64.
65
Robson v Hallett, (1967) 51 Cr App R 307, [1967] 3 WLUK 31 at 311 (Eng Div Ct).
66
R v Blair, 2001 BCPC 266 at para 25. See also R v Bushman, 1968 CanLII 802, 1968 CarswellBC 28 at para 15
(CA) (WL Can)..
56

9

Full citation: Alexandra Flynn & Estair Van Wagner, “A Colonial Castle: Defence of Property in R v Stanley”
(2020) 98:2 Canadian Bar Review 359-387.

In 2012, the defence of property in section 35 was amended through Bill C-26, which entered
into force on March 11, 2013.67 The new amendments were intended to simplify existing law
and extract the core of the defence.68 The Parliamentary Secretary cited the work of Professor
Don Stuart, who wrote: “The defences of person and property in Canadian law are bedevilled
by excessively complex and sometimes obtuse Code provisions.”69 The amendments were
intended to clean up legislation in order to remedy potential jury confusion, avoid unnecessary
grounds of appeal, and help the public, police, prosecutors, and the court understand the
legislation’s intent and application.70 Courts have since been navigating its application.71
Some lawmakers have suggested that the reforms were more than simply an
administrative clean-up. The Justice Minister affirmed that warning shots over the head of
intruders on private property would be reasonable under the provisions of the amended law, even
though this legal position had not yet been affirmed by the courts.72 At a public event in 2015,
then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper controversially linked gun ownership with security for rural
property owners. His office subsequently sent out a communication referring to Harper’s
comments that Jenni Byrne, the Conservatives’ national campaign manager paraphrased as “gun
ownership is important for safety for those of us who live a ways from immediate police
assistance” and continued, “Our Conservative party recognizes that guns play an important role
in the livelihoods, recreation and safety of many Canadians.”73
Additionally, the amended provision omitted an important feature of the prior provision:
the proportionality requirement. The SCC had previously endorsed a proportionality approach in
R v Szczerbaniwicz. The majority and dissent disagreed about the application of proportionality.
The majority cited the necessity restriction set out in Baxter, in which Justice Martin stated, “the
harm sought to be prevented could not be prevented by less violent means and that the injury or
Citizen’s Arrest and Self-defence Act, SC 2012, c 9, in force March 11, 2013 by Proclamation in accordance with
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ONCJ 677. For cases that deal with the current defence of property in the Criminal Code but without explicit
reference to the pre-amendments version, see e.g., R v MEH, 2016 BCPC 290; R v Trudeau, 2017 ONCJ 793; R v
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harm done by, or which might reasonably be anticipated from the force used is not
disproportioned [sic] to the injury or harm it is intended to prevent.”74 The proportionality
requirement has been characterized as an inquiry into whether the force used was “reasonable in
all the circumstances.”75 The reasonableness of “all the circumstances” necessarily includes the
accused’s subjective belief as to the nature of the danger or harm, but an objective component of
the defence is also required: the subjective belief must be based on reasonable grounds.76
Professor Kent Roach expressed concern that the removal of the proportionality requirement in
the 2012 amendment to section 35 could strengthen a “disproportionately violent” defence of
property by an accused.77 To date, there has been no jurisprudence regarding the effects of this
removal.78
In short, under civil law, an individual who is deemed to be a trespasser can be met with
consequences ranging from a civil remedy of damages, to an injunction, to a modest fine.
Defence of property permits a person in peaceable possession of property, or a person assisting
someone they believe to be in peaceable possession of property, to commit a reasonable act
(including use of force) for the purpose of protecting that property from being taken, damaged,
or trespassed upon. The next section sets out the manner in which trespass and defence of
property were raised in R v Stanley, and how it came to be that although the defence itself was
not asserted, trespass still shaped the outcome of the trial.
3. Raising Trespass without Defence of Property
A. ‘Air of reality’ and defence of property
In criminal law, unique tests are associated with different defences, and each and every prong of
the test requires an evidential foundation (“air of reality”).79 Defences must have an air of reality
in order to be included by judges in their jury instructions.80 It is the responsibility of defence
counsel to establish the existence of an evidential basis for the defence.81 In R v Cinous, the SCC
stated:
The basic requirement of an evidential foundation for defences gives rise to two wellestablished principles. First, a trial judge must put to the jury all defences that arise on
the facts, whether or not they have been specifically raised by an accused. Where there is
an air of reality to a defence, it should go to the jury. Second, a trial judge has a positive
duty to keep from the jury defences lacking an evidential foundation. A defence that lacks
74
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an air of reality should be kept from the jury [citations omitted]. This is so even when the
defence lacking an air of reality represents the accused's only chance for an acquittal[.]82

Where the accused invokes the defence of property, the onus is on the Crown to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in defence of property.83 However, the Court in
Gunning found that “[i]t is not incumbent upon the Crown in every trial to negative [sic] all
conceivable defences no matter how fanciful or speculative they may be”.84 A minimum
evidentiary threshold must be met before the issue is “put in play” —a defence will be in play
whenever a properly instructed jury could reasonably, on account of the evidence, conclude in
favour of the accused.85
In R v Weare, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal concluded that even where a trial judge
may find a victim to not be a trespasser, the trial judge must go on to consider whether there is
any evidence that could rationally form the foundation for a reasonable belief that the
complainant was a trespasser. If so, the defence of property must be considered.86 If not, as in R v
Leggot, “[t]here is no possibility the verdict would have been different had the trial judge
specifically turned his mind to the question of whether the appellant believed she was a
trespasser.”87 Failure on the judge’s part in either of these determinations is an error of law.88*
An appellate court must determine if “there is any reasonable possibility that the verdict would
have been different had the error at issue not been made.”89 In other words, if the Crown does not
object, the judge has a positive duty to intervene so that the jury does not illegitimately rely on an
unavailable defence of property in its deliberations. As was upheld by the New Brunswick Court
of Appeal, in R v O’Brien, a judge may put two defences to the jury, assuming there is evidence
to support the objective and subjective elements of each component of the defences.90 However,
the instructions put to the jury must not be “contradictory” or “confusing.”91
B. A ‘self-defence circumstance’
In Stanley, the judge addressed the air of reality even though the accused did not formally argue
the defence of property, because it formed part of the defence’s case. In particular, the defence
was used implicitly to justify Stanley’s use of the gun to respond to the presence of the youths on
his property. Defence counsel asserted that the conduct of the young people contributed to the
accident by creating a “self-defence circumstance.” Stanley’s lawyer, Scott Spencer, opened the
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trial by stating that Stanley and his son (who was also on the farm that day) were not “looking
for trouble” when the grey SUV pulled up.92 Spencer stated:
Colten Boushie’s death is a tragedy. There is no doubt about that. And we can never lose
sight of that. No one will lose sight of that. And I’ll also say right now, this isn’t a justified
death. This is not – it’s not – this death is not justified legally or morally. It is never, never
right to take somebody’s life over property, but that’s not what this case is about. It is
perhaps in the rarest of circumstances appropriate to use lethal force to defend you or
your family. But this isn’t that case, either.93

Spencer argued that the case was not only about property or self-defence case, commenting “this
is really not a murder case at all.”94 Instead, he argued that “[t]his is a case about what can go
terribly wrong when you create a situation which is in the nature of a home invasion.”95
According to Spencer, Stanley did not have the luxury of waiting for police to arrive at his
isolated farm. He acknowledged that the young people were not on trial, but alleged that they had
created a ‘panic situation.’ As a result, Spencer argued it was ‘reasonable’ to fire warning shots
at intruders. According to journalist Olivia Stefanovich, “[a]lthough he didn’t argue self-defence,
Stanley testified that he drew his gun when Boushie and his friends drove onto his rural property
to fire warning shots because he thought they were stealing.”96
Spencer explained the events leading up to the allegedly accidental deadly shot by
invoking the castle doctrine and linking trespass to the fear of violent invasion. He argued that
while the shooting was not justified in self-defence, “there is a self-defence factor” based on the
“reasonableness” of “what can you do to protect yourself in those circumstances?”97 Spencer
acknowledged that “you can’t use lethal force,” but also asked, “is it reasonable to attempt to
deal with the circumstance to defend you and your family? And it’s not about property. It’s about
injury. That was the fear.”98 He characterized the youths as “essentially intruders”: “[Y]ou have
to view it from Gerry [Stanley]’s perspective, … what he thought when he was faced with this
sudden intrusion. The fear of the unknown.”99 According to Spencer, a “self-defence
circumstance” did not give rise to the defence of property, but rather to accident.100 The defence
successfully used the defence of property to separate the events leading up to the fatal shot from
the shot itself. Spencer was able to justify the use of the gun by invoking Stanley’s right to
defend his property without having to justify the tragic consequences.
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C. Consideration of the defence of property by the court
At trial, the Court considered Stanley’s firing of shots in the air in the context of self-defence and
the defence of property.101 The Court rightfully cautioned that in the jury charge the parties
needed to be “very careful that we ground everything in the evidence that has been called thus
far so there is a bit of an air of reality.”102 Chief Justice Popescul struggled to make sense of how
the evidence raised during the trial translated into a jury charge: “[T]o be as honest as I can with
you, which is -- I am seeking guidance from very experienced lawyers to help me get the charge
right so that I can present a fair, balanced, legally accurate charge to the jury.”103
The defence framed Stanley’s use of the gun as “[S]elf-defence is a justification, a lawful
justification, for firing the warning shots.”104 The Court disagreed, suggesting instead that:
[T]he evidence seems to suggest that if anything, he was trying to scare them off his
property. His property had been tampered with. He was in peaceable possession of the
property, and the question would be whether or not he took reasonable steps to scare them
off his property. That would be defence of property[.]105

The Court referred to various scenarios that would explain Stanley’s firing of the gun in the air
when the youths entered the farm without raising the defence of property. Spencer acknowledged
there would be no justification for firing against someone for merely entering a property,106 but
agreed that in a situation where a trespasser was asked to leave, firing a gun would fall under the
defence of property.107 Chief Justice Popescul clarified the defence’s position that “up until a
certain point … he [was] justified in firing a few rounds in the air”, but also noted that “if
somebody has a … gun of any sort, and if it goes off and kills somebody, they’ve got some
explaining to do.”108
The Crown asked whether the defence of property for Stanley’s firing of the weapon in
the air should be put to the jury.109 Senior Crown Prosecutor Bill Burge noted that putting the
defence of property to the jury for this part of the legal story would get “pretty complicated.”110
This is consistent with the case of O’Brien, where the Court found that raising both the defence
of accident and the defence of property could be confusing to the jury.111 Chief Justice Popescul
proposed, “would it be fair to say that in the circumstances of this case, the Crown and defence
agree that Mr. Stanley’s actions in getting the gun was -- was lawful, and that if you find he fired
them in the air, that in and of itself is lawful, as well?”112 Burge agreed to “make the concession
101
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that this is -- this is within his right as a property owner.”113 In doing so, the Crown implicitly
condoned the defence’s racist trespass narrative and the presumptive reasonableness of Stanley’s
fear-driven violent response, which simultaneously became both core elements of the case and
immune from further questions or critiques.
The judge, prosecutor, and defence agreed to bifurcate the events on the farm, such that
the firing of the gun in the air was lawful under each of the elements of section 35 of the
Criminal Code, but the next set of events would need to be considered by the jury on the basis of
defence of accident. They agreed that the charge would read, “Mr. Stanley was lawfully justified
in the circumstances of this case to retrieve his firearm and to fire it into the air as a warning -- as
warning shots, if you find that is what he did. Beyond that, it is up to you to determine if his acts
were lawful.”114 Chief Justice Popescul explained the charge as follows:
[W]hat we’re doing is we are focussing the jury on the parts that matter. So rather than
the jury coming back with a question for me, well, was it lawful in the first place for him
to have this gun and can he shoot it in the air, is that all right? We’re saying, yeah, that’s
all fine up until this point. … if he was firing them in the air, that that was lawful up to
that point, and beyond then, that’s what we have to … worry about.115

In the end, Chief Justice Popescul stated in his instructions to the jury:
I have already told you that it is not disputed that Mr. Stanley was legally justified in
defence of his property, to retrieve his handgun and fire it into the air, if you find that
that is what he did, in light of what had gone on in his farmyard. However, you must
now closely analyze whether his actions between that point and the shooting of Mr.
Boushie amount to careless use of that firearm and whether he had a lawful excuse.116

Put another way, Stanley’s act of shooting the gun in the air was justified by the Court on the
basis of the defence of property without any consideration by the jury. Stanley’s fear of
Indigenous youths and their status as trespassers was deemed presumptively reasonable. The
lawfulness of his resort to violence without warning or a request for them to leave was deemed
by the Court, with consent of the Crown, not to matter.
4. Dismantling the Castle: Indigenous Peoples and Trespass
Gerald Stanley’s acquittal had an impact on the justice system more broadly, but it also has
particularly negative consequences for Indigenous persons in the context of Treaty relations and
trespass, as discussed below.
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A. Trespass in the context of Treaty relations
Despite the centrality of treaties to the foundation of Canada as a nation state, the legal
construction of trespass in Canadian law does not acknowledge Treaty rights and relationships.
Nor does it allow for the consideration of non-human, past, or future beneficiaries to whom legal
duties may be owed under Indigenous law.117 As Michael Asch noted, “one cannot have
Confederation until there is a home on which to build it, and without treaties we have no home
here.”118 Settler claims to belonging, which is at the root of peaceable possession, therefore relies
on the legitimacy and the honouring of the treaties, and “keeping those promises is inviolate, for
to violate these promises is to invalidate our right to be here.”119
Boushie’s death and the Stanley trial took place on Treaty 6 territory.120 This means that
Stanley’s farm was located on contested land. Historian Sheldon Krasowski conducted a detailed
examination of Indigenous and non-Indigenous accounts of the negotiations involved historic
treaties. He demonstrated that official Canadian accounts refer to the negotiations for Treaty 6
cession and surrender of Indigenous land to the Crown, but that both eyewitness accounts and
oral histories contradict these accounts.121 Accounts of meetings leading up to the negotiations
reveal that Treaty 6 Chiefs were mainly concerned with protection of Indigenous lands from
encroachment, and as a result this was the main point of discussion.122
Cree lawyer Sharon Venne explained that all Indigenous nations in the Treaty 6 territory
would have followed protocol requesting the Crown to enter into a Treaty before coming onto
their land, in recognition of their jurisdiction over the area.123 She explained that this was the
only valid way for others, Indigenous nations or the Crown, to come onto the land.124 Indeed,
upon learning about the acquisition of land in their territory by the Hudson’s Bay Company, the
Chiefs quickly asserted their jurisdiction and requested that the Queen resolve the issue, clearly
CED 4th (online), Torts, “Trespass” (II.1.) at § 29. For discussion of treaty relations in Saskatchewan, see Harold
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asserting that the transactions were invalid under Indigenous law. In the lead-up to Treaty 6
negotiations, the Cree stopped surveyors and the construction of telegraph lines, demanding that
the Crown recognize their authority over their lands.125 When the Crown requested to make a
Treaty in the lands that make up Treaty 6, the relevant Indigenous nations (Cree, Assiniboine,
Saulteux, and Dene) formed an alliance and held several days of meetings to reach an agreement
about their position. Only then did they meet with the Crown. The Indigenous parties selected
the site and negotiations were conducted in accordance with Indigenous protocols, including the
Cree Sacred Pipe Ceremony, which linked the partners in an unbreakable relationship “based on
happiness, health, and respect.”126
The oral histories of Treaty 6 Elders assert there was no cede and surrender clause agreed
to in the treaty negotiations.127 As noted above, this has been confirmed by eyewitness accounts
from non-Indigenous observers. Rather, the land was requested for shared use by settlers. Venne
noted this was interpreted as a loan and not a sale, which would not have been agreed to either as
a matter of logic or as a possibility in Indigenous law.128 As Michael Coyle noted, “[b]ecause the
historical land treaty was an institution established for the purpose of permitting the coexistence
of two sets of peoples on treaty lands, it cannot be rationally interpreted as effecting an entirely
improvident arrangement for one of the treaty parties.”129 The Chiefs interpreted the agreement
to mean that they could hold as much land for themselves as they wanted: according to Elders,
reserves were not lands given to Indigenous peoples by the Crown, because the Crown had no
jurisdiction over the land. In an exchange unrecorded in official accounts but recorded by the
Chief’s translator, Peter Erasmus, Chief Poundmaker responded to the “audacity of the treaty
commissioner to describe reserved lands as one of the benefits of the treaty.”130 Chief
Poundmaker commented, “This is our land it isn’t a piece of pemmican to be cut off and given
in little pieces back to us. It is ours and we will take what we want.”131 Sharing of the land was
interpreted as ensuring the people “would never be in want as they had ensured their future good
life by sharing their lands.”132 According to Venne, the Treaty was also not understood as
extending to the subsurface, to the waters, or to animals, including birds. Further, mountains and
lands within four days walk could not have been included because of their spiritual
significance.* Venne also noted that the promise of police protection was a key part of the
Treaty. Specifically, the Northwest Mounted Police were permitted into the territory for the
protection of Indigenous Peoples against settlers.133 Crucially, as Venne pointed out, the Treaty
records the rights and obligations of non-Indigenous peoples in the territory—the rights to share
the land and resources, to co-exist peacefully with Indigenous neighbours, and to care for the
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land.134 All of these elements require fulfilling the promises fairly and honourably made to
Indigenous Treaty partners.135
As described above, the concept of trespass assumes clear title. Indeed, the defence of
property relies on the concept of peaceable possession, the old English legal concept requiring
that there be no adverse claims to the lands in question.136 Once one acknowledges the multiple
and overlapping relationships with private land, as evidenced by the discussion of historic
treaties above, the concept of peaceable possession becomes much more difficult to sustain.
Certainly, it complicates Stanley’s quick resort to violence and the link between the
“reasonableness” of his fears and the racist and colonial underpinnings of the trespass narrative
woven into the Stanley trial by the defence. The next section builds on this discussion, and the
troubling way that Indigenous attempts to invoke the defence of property and protect their own
lands are managed.
B. Defence of property and Indigenous lands
Canadian courts treat lands claimed by Indigenous communities and non-Indigenous people
differently with regard to trespass and defence of property. For example, the courts have
categorically rejected Indigenous title as a challenge to defence of property. The Ontario Court
of Justice has stated that there are “two legalities … the defendant has no right to the property,
and the complainant has all the right to the property.”137 In R v Cormier, the Court stated that
“interference with “peaceable possession” of property” means someone is either: “about to enter,
entering or having entered to the property, without lawful entitlement; …about to take, taking or
having just taken the property; or … about to damage or destroy or in the process of damaging or
destroying the property or making it inoperative.”138
Courts have found that these criteria do not apply to First Nations lands, either reserve or
traditional territory. Some have adopted the definition of “peaceable possession” published in
Black’s Law Dictionary: “… such as is acquiesced in by all other persons, including rival
claimants, and not disturbed by any forcible attempt at ouster nor by adverse suits to recover the
possession of the estate.”139 The Alberta Court of Appeal elaborated on this definition, stating
that the word “peaceable” is not synonymous with “peaceful.”140 Instead, “peaceable” means
possession that is “not seriously challenged by others”141 and any challenge to the possession
should be “unlikely to lead to violence.”142 The Court stated:
The demand that the possession be “peaceable” greatly limits the defence. That
word is not synonymous with peaceful …143
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As noted by the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, the use of the
“peaceable possession” rule in the context of Indigenous land defenders who are attempting to
protect lands unjustly ignores the violent and racist means by which Indigenous peoples have
been dispossessed, and therefore are unable to satisfy the standard.144
In George, the case involved the occupation of a park by Indigenous persons. The park
had originally been part of an Aboriginal land grant, but had been expropriated by the federal
government.145 When violence broke out between the occupiers and the police, the Court
rejected the Indigenous defendant’s defence of property claim because the occupation of the park
was clearly challenged from the outset. It stated that the defendant was aware of this challenge,
and therefore did not have “an honest but mistaken belief in the nature of the Band members’
possession of the park.”146 Peaceable possession, in contrast, is understood as possession that is
not seriously challenged by others and is therefore unlikely to lead to violence. In George, the
Court found that the Indigenous defendants were aware that their possession of the park was
challenged from the outset. Indeed, it was noted that they had stockpiled sticks and rocks in
contemplation of violence. The Court also found that their use of force against the police was not
necessary, reasonable, or proportionate.147
In R v Born with a Tooth, members of the Peigan Nation had camped in a right-of-way
area over which they did not have peaceful possession, even if they did have some rights.148
Police officers and others attempted to gain access to the area in question. The Court noted:
An accused might, honestly but mistakenly, believe that he has a measure of control over
the lands, or that his supposed control is unchallenged, or he might believe in a set of
facts which, if true, makes the victim a trespasser. But honest mistake of fact appears not
to be enough for the last element, because that requires that the reasonableness of the
force meet an objective, not just a subjective, test.149

The Court concluded, “all citizens of Canada have a duty to inform themselves correctly about
the law” and that failure to do so cannot be used as a defence.150 As a result, in this case there
could be no finding of peaceable possession, and therefore, no application of the defence of
property.151 This situation creates an imbalance in the application of the defence of property to
Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships with land.152 It also fundamentally ignores the
existence and tenets of treaties, most significantly the role of Indigenous legal orders—both
internally for Indigenous nations, and externally in shaping Canadian property relations through
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treaty partnerships. In other parts of Canada, it ignores the assertion of title and jurisdiction over
land and resources in both Canadian and Indigenous law.
Failure to recognize Indigenous relations to land as a root of possession that can be
lawfully exercised and defended leads to individual injustices for the Indigenous parties in cases
such as these. It also perpetuates the colonial model of unitary Crown sovereignty, which leads
to intractable conflicts about the governance of land and resources.153 The Yellowhead Institute
recently found that 76 percent of injunctions filed by corporations against First Nations—often
deemed to be trespassing as they defend traditional territory from development—were granted,
while less than 20 percent of those filed by First Nations against corporations or governments
were granted.154 It concluded that Indigenous law has not been accepted by the courts as a
defensible basis for trespass.155 As we write, Indigenous land protectors and allies are being
arrested and forcibly removed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from unceded
Wet’suwet’en territory in British Columbia to enforce an injunction allowing a private gas
company to build a pipeline along “Crown” land, despite being evicted by the heredity chiefs,
who were recognized by the SCC as the land holders in the landmark Delgamuukw v British
Columbia decision.156 Protests throughout Canada continue to shut down highways, bridges, and
rail corridors in solidarity.157
The differential treatment of Indigenous claims to property rights and the availability of
the defence of property are compounded by the failure of the criminal justice system to ensure
that Indigenous victims of crime are not themselves criminalized and dehumanized as a result of
racial bias and stereotypes. As the SCC has observed “… it would be naïve to assume that the
moment the jurors enter the courtroom, they leave their biases, prejudices, and sympathies
behind.”158 The next section explores the failure of the judge in the Stanley trial to address the
intersection between Saskatchewan’s contested property relations and racial prejudice.
C. Jury instructions in cases of Indigenous victims and trespass claims
In the Stanley trial, the jury was not cautioned about local claims of trespass allegedly caused by
Indigenous youths nor the high level of discrimination against Indigenous peoples. Instead, in
regard to witnesses, Chief Justice Popescul stated:
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Did the witness seem to be reporting to you what he or she saw and heard or simply
putting together an account based on … other sources[?] Did the witness’s testimony
seem reasonable and consistent? Is it similar to or different from what other witnesses
said about the same events? Did the witness say or do something different on an earlier
occasion? … Is the inconsistency about something important or a minor detail? Does it
seem like an honest mistake? Is it a deliberate lie? Is the inconsistency because the witness
said something different or because he or she failed to mention something? Is there any
explanation for it? Does the explanation make sense? What was the witness’s manner
when he or she testified?159

Chief Justice Popescul gave only the following cautions:
“[D]o not jump to conclusions based entirely on how a witness has testified. Looks can
be deceiving. Giving evidence in a trial is not a common experience for many witnesses.
People react and appear differently. Witnesses come from different backgrounds. They
have different abilities, values and life experiences. There are simply too many variables
to make the manner in which a witness testifies the only or most important factor in your
decision.”160

In the context of Saskatchewan’s contested property relations, the judge could, and
should, have gone further to expressly caution the jury about racial bias or biased associations
with terms used by witnesses or other actors during the trial.
In Saskatchewan, rural residents and groups have advocated for looser laws around gun
possession and stronger trespass laws to address alleged increases in “rural crime.”161 As noted
above, amendments to the TPA remove the requirements for notice and enclosure, therefore
requiring explicit consent to enter private property. The changes mean that landowners can treat
anyone entering their lands as trespassers, even prior to asking them to leave the property. The
Federation of Sovereign Indigenous Nations has expressed serious concerns about the law and
the lack of consultation, and in February 2019 voted to oppose the amendments. Vice Chief
Heather Bear stated that the changes would cause more rural crime, rather than less.162 The
amendments came after a 2017 decision to arm conservation officers with semi-automatic
carbine rifles, which FSIN also strongly opposed, suggesting it breached inherent and Treaty
rights and would result in more Indigenous people in jail.163
Rural residents have openly discussed the availability of the defence of property online.
In a March 15, 2016 post on the online journal Ammoland, an anonymous commenter wrote:
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Unless you’ve done something terribly wrong, the odds of you being convicted are on
your side. The CSSA has dealt with many of these types of cases over the years, and in
only one case was the individual convicted. To re-cap:
• Yes, you will be charged with a very serious crime.
• Yes, this will be the most stressful time of your life.
• Yes, this entire process will cost you a lot of money.
However, at the end of it all, justice will usually prevail and you will not go to prison.164

In R v Barton, the SCC examined the role of the trial judge in addressing “biases, prejudices,
and stereotypes that lurk beneath the surface, thereby allowing all justice system participants to
address them head-on — openly, honestly, and without fear.”165 At trial, the Crown, the
defence, and the trial judge had repeatedly referred to the Indigenous victim, Cindy Gladue, as a
“prostitute,” “Native girl,” or “Native woman.”* The majority of the SCC in Barton noted the
“invasive,” “elusive,” and “corrosive” nature of racism against Indigenous people in the context
of jury trials, as recognized in R v Williams.166
They specifically identified the language used to refer to Ms. Gladue at trial as “problematic”167
and suggested that the use of such descriptors may give rise to situations where a trial judge
should intervene to ensure all participants in the justice system are treated with “dignity,
humanity and respect.”168 The majority suggested trial judges consider the “additional
safeguard” of “express instruction countering prejudice” beyond a generic jury instruction about
impartiality, which they grounded in ss 15, 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.169 In the context of an
Indigenous victim, the majority specifically noted the relevance of explaining the history and
ongoing effects of colonization and anti-Indigenous racism to jurors, to ensure they do not rely
on stereotypes and racial prejudice during their deliberations.170 Justice Moldaver, writing for
the majority, did not go as far as the dissent, according to which the lack of such instructions
rendered the whole trial unfair.171 However, he concluded that by failing to ensure Ms. Gladue
was given the law’s full protection, the criminal justice system “let her down — indeed, it let us
all down.”172
It is very likely that references to Boushie and his friends as “trespassers” were
compounded by systemic racism. The failure to address such references during the trial and the
generic instruction to the jury, at best, failed to ensure the jury did not draw on “biases prejudices
and stereotypes” about criminality and Indigenous youths and the “reasonable” nature of being
fearful of young Indigenous men.173 At worst, it invited “devastatingly prejudicial effects,”
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which may have rendered the entire process unfair.174 The lack of caution by the judge was
compounded by the lack of consideration as to whether the use of a gun in response to trespass is
ever justifiable. The jury was not required to weigh the very real possibility that the Indigeneity
of these youths, and the claim that they were trespassing on the Stanley farm, led to the verdict of
not guilty.
5. Conclusion
The Stanley trial raised important issues related to the unique land-based tensions in rural
Saskatchewan and how these may have affected the outcome of the trial. First, the defendant’s
legal story was underscored by narratives of trespass. As defence council noted in the trial, “[f]or
farm people, your yard is your castle.”175 This kind of sentiment also emerged in local media
coverage, and is linked to the reforms of the defence of property, which were introduced by the
Government of Canada in response to vocal demands to increase protection for property owners
who expel alleged trespassers from “their” land. These same sentiments also underpin recent
reforms to Saskatchewan’s T PA.176
Second, the Stanley trial and the resulting precedent has particular consequence for
Indigenous persons. It reflects the extent to which Treaty 6 and Indigenous relationships with
land are generally ignored in criminal law tests for “peaceable possession”. Specifically,
traditional territory is never peaceably possessed, so the defence of property is not available to
Indigenous persons seeking to defend these lands. Moreover, although Treaty 6 is rooted in an
agreement to share the land and does not recognize features of colonial law such as exclusive
ownership, the “reasonableness” of Stanley’s violent defence of his farm did not account for
Indigenous worldviews and laws.
Third, the judge’s failure to address how the defence’s invocation of trespass and rural crime
could be linked with anti-Indigenous racism may have contributed to Stanley’s exoneration. As
the SCC signaled in Barton, juries must be made aware of the ways in which biases and
prejudice factor into decision-making. Stanley’s invocation of trespass, the castle doctrine, and
the notion of a “self-defence circumstance” informed the Crown and the Court’s concession that
his use of the firearm was lawful. As a result, neither the defence nor the jury were asked to
grapple with how the reasonableness of his violent actions were grounded in racial bias and a
fear of Indigenous youths. The symbolism of defence of property far outweighed its formal legal
application in this case. The reasonableness of resorting to violence in defence of property was
presumed and was separated from the tragic consequences. In the specific social context of rural
Saskatchewan, Stanley’s invocations of trespass alongside the Indigeneity of Boushie and his
friends, should have signalled to the trial judge the he should have included additional safeguards
in his jury charge. He should have given express instructions countering prejudice beyond the
generic jury instruction about impartiality. He should also have clarified the irrelevance of much
of Stanley’s narrative Stanley to the determination of whether the third shot was in fact an
accident.
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The death of Colten Boushie was a tragedy. The Stanley trial was also a tragedy, because
crucial issues remain unexamined and important questions remain unanswered. We will never
know whether jury instructions that explicitly alerted the jury to the issue of racial bias in
situations of trespass, and in the context of Indigeneity, would have made a difference. Judges
and juries must carefully consider the use of force to defend property. They must not rely on
presumptions and fear-driven biases about who belongs, and who matters, on the lands we call
Canada. As Justice Moldaver concluded in Barton, “we can – and must – do better.”177
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